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ABSTRACT 
Militaries globally now grapple with the best method to manage 
information transmitted through new technologies, especially during operations in 
the information environment aimed to defend the democracy of sovereign states. 
Through this study, an ethically acceptable approach is sought to counter hostile 
narratives in a segregated marketplace of ideas. Considering developing countries 
in Africa, like Nigeria that recently attained 21 years of uninterrupted democracy, 
how then can they counter the incessant collective violence inspired by new 
technologies? Building on previous research in this field that focused on quantitative 
analysis of social media data, I conduct statistical analysis to assess the effect that 
different forms of discourse may generate in increasing or reducing violence in Nigeria 
from 2013 to 2014. I find that unifying words and concepts shared on social media in 
Nigeria are associated with reduced occurrence of collective violence. In addition, I 
show how social network analysis can be used to provide in-depth visualization of 
the structure of the influence networks operating in the Nigerian information 
environment. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW .....................................................................................3 
A. SOCIAL MEDIA AND COLLECTIVE ACTION .................................3 
B. INFORMATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING 
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE ....................................................................5 
C. PERSUASIVE INFORMATION .............................................................7 
D. SOCIAL MEDIA AND VIOLENT INFORMATION 
NETWORKS IN NIGERIA ......................................................................9 
III. BACKGROUND ..................................................................................................11 
A. HISTORY OF INFORMATION INFLUENCING 
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA...........................................11 
1. Location ........................................................................................11 
2. Colonial Era ..................................................................................11 
3. Post-colonial and Military Era ...................................................12 
4. Democratic Transition .................................................................13 
5. The Armed Forces of Nigeria Information Approach ..............15 
IV. RESEARCH METHOD ......................................................................................19 
A. HYPOTHESES ........................................................................................19 
B. RESEARCH DATA .................................................................................20 
1. Describing the Variables .............................................................20 
2. Dependent Variable .....................................................................21 
3. Independent Variables.................................................................23 
4. Text Processing.............................................................................26 
5. Concept Mining ............................................................................27 
6. Lagged Variables .........................................................................27 
7. Research Question .......................................................................28 
V. RESULTS .............................................................................................................29 
A. REGRESSION ANALYSIS ....................................................................29 
B. FINDINGS—POSITIVE DISCOURSE IS ASSOCIATED 
WITH REDUCED VIOLENCE .............................................................31 
1. Model 1 ..........................................................................................31 
2. Model 2 ..........................................................................................32 
3. Model 3 ..........................................................................................34 
viii 
4. Models 4 and 5 ..............................................................................35 
VI. VISUALIZING INFLUENCE NETWORKS IN NIGERIA ...........................37 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION .......................................................................37 
B. METHODOLOGY AND DATA ............................................................37 
C. NETWORK STRUCTURE.....................................................................37 
1. Topographical Metrics ................................................................37 
1. Centrality Measures.....................................................................39 
2. Cohesive Subgroups .....................................................................42 
D. TEXT ANALYSIS ...................................................................................43 
1. Subgroup Merged with Text .......................................................45 
E. SUMMARY ..............................................................................................48 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH ...............................................51 
A. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................51 
B. FURTHER RESEARCH .........................................................................52 
APPENDIX .......................................................................................................................55 
A. NIGERIAN MULTILINGUAL DICTIONARY OF “PEACE 
AND VIOLENCE”...................................................................................55 
B. TABLE A2. HASHTAGS AND TWITTER ACCOUNTS 
SEARCHED .............................................................................................81 
C. TABLE A 3. NRN TOPIC MODELLING TABLE ..............................82 
D. TABLE A 4. NRN TOPIC MODULARITY CLASS TABLE .............83 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................85 




LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. Map of Nigeria Showing the 36 States and Federal Capital Territory. .....21 
Figure 2. Violent Events and Fatalities in Nigeria, 2013–2014 ................................22 
Figure 3. Nigerian Heat Map showing Population Distribution ...............................23 
Figure 4. Nigerian GDP.............................................................................................24 
Figure 5. Population Density and Violence in Nigeria. ............................................25 
Figure 6. Social Media Traffic in Nigeria .................................................................26 
Figure 7. Effect of Distance to Prior Violence. .........................................................32 
Figure 8. Effect of “Nigeria” Discourse ....................................................................33 
Figure 9. Effect of “Unity” Discourse .......................................................................33 
Figure 10. Interactive Effect of “God” and “Unity” Discourse ..................................35 
Figure 11. Interactive Terms between Violence Lag and Unity. ................................36 
Figure 12. NRN Giant Component Nodes Sized by Degree Centrality ......................38 
Figure 13. Network Nodes Colored by Modularity ....................................................40 
Figure 14. NRN Sized and Colored by Degree ...........................................................42 
Figure 15. Latent Dirichlet Allocation Chart ..............................................................44 
Figure 16. Mazi Moses Agbo Subgroup .....................................................................45 
Figure 1. Ottotgs/Humangle Subgroup .....................................................................46 
Figure 2. Sahara/Reporters Subgroup .......................................................................47 
Figure 3. Mazi Nnamdi Kanu Subgroup ...................................................................48 
  
x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Poisson Regression Nigerian Violence and Twitter Discourse .................30 
Table 2. Nigerian Violence Retweet Network Topography Scores .........................39 
Table 3. NRN Actors Ranked by Centrality Nigerian Retweets ..............................41 
Table 4. Topic Modeling ..........................................................................................43 
 
xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AFN Armed Forces of Nigeria  
BHT  Boko Haram Terrorist  
CTCOIN Counterterrorist counterinsurgency 
FGN Federal Government of Nigeria 
ISWAP  Islamic State in West African Province 
OIE Operations in the Informational Environment 
SNA Social Network Analysis 
VA Visual Analytics 
VEO Violent Extremist Organization 
  
xiv 




First and foremost, my special appreciation goes to Professor Camber T. Warren, 
my advisor, and to Professor Ryan Maness, for their indefatigable guidance in producing 
this thesis. Next to be acknowledged are the erudite professors and staff of the Defense 
Analysis Department who have contributed to my knowledge, which has transformed 
to this thesis. Special mention of the fantastic staff of the International Graduate 
Program Office and the entire staff of Naval Postgraduate School for providing a 
conducive environment to add to the body of knowledge on informational approach to 
countering violence. 
xvi 




Information sharing has existed from the earliest time and become more 
sophisticated as humans advance in technology and innovation. Modern means of sharing 
information has attained ubiquity through the internet, and social media, surpassing the 
traditional mass communication and social communication controlled by state actors.1 
While the omnipresent form of social media information has unquantifiable advantages, 
some undemocratic states and non-state actors like violent extremist organizations (VEOs) 
exploit new technologies to incite people. One growing trend is the trust built on social 
media information, primarily through Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and Tik 
Tok as against mass and social communication that could be quickly censored.2 Social 
media technology has gained wide acceptance as the best form of synchronous and 
asynchronous communication supported by information sharing. The shift of trust stems 
from advancement in technology that creates a segregated marketplace of ideas that 
encourages division and, in the long run, violence, unlike a unified market place of ideas 
that appeals to broad audiences.3 Consequently, if social media influences information that 
creates a segregated marketplace of ideas, many countries are vulnerable to collective 
violence occasioned by disinformation. 
The bias about the information shared on social media has set the right conditions 
for VEOs and proxies to increasingly use social media apps to conduct information warfare 
through narratives that can affect people’s psychology. Scholars and state actors in 
developed countries grapple with identifying the constituents of persuasive information 
 
1 Peter Hirshberg, “First the Media, Then Us: How the Internet Changed the Fundamental Nature of 
the Communication and Its Relationship with the Audience,” OpenMind (blog), accessed October 20, 2020, 
https://www.bbvaopenmind.com/en/articles/first-the-media-then-us-how-the-internet-changed-the-
fundamental-nature-of-the-communication-and-its-relationship-with-the-audience/. 
2 “Is Social Media Now a Credible News Source? - GlobalWebIndex,” GWI, October 29, 2019, 
https://blog.globalwebindex.com/chart-of-the-week/who-are-news-networkers/. 
3 T Camber Warren, “Explosive Connections? Mass Media, Social Media, and the Geography of 
Collective Violence in African States,” Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 3 (2015): 297–311. 
2 
created by VEOs, while efforts to develop the best counternarratives are highly desirable.4 
In countering false information in a democracy, pertinent persuasive information 
influences people to adhere to indigenous citizens’ moral and legal rights. Of course, 
tyrants, totalitarians, and demagogues use psychological operations and propaganda on 
their own citizens; and this sometimes results in such administration’s implosion. 
Therefore, how can developing countries in Africa like Nigeria that recently attained 21 
years of uninterrupted democracy, counter incessant collective violence that has threatened 
its unity? Building on previous research in this field that focused on collective violence in 
Africa and idioms of authority radicalization in Nigerian social communication.5 I begin 
by identifying anodyne words and information shared on social media peculiar to the 
influential ethnic, religious, and regional groups in Nigeria.6 I hypothesize that influential 
information has the potential to influence Nigerians to be patriotic and possibly shun 
violence. Furthermore, it is expedient that we know words and expressions that have the 
potential to create a collection of ideas that could incite a group to violence.  
This study explores the evolving causes of violence and informational approaches 
to mitigating recurrent violence in Nigeria. With the successful application of information 
operations by the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) in Kano State, the need to adopt a 
scientific approach for subsequent operations is required. This research seeks to answer  
the question, how can influence in the information environment reduce collective violence 
in Nigeria? Given the technology, this study aims to advance the knowledge of the  
AFN operations in the information environment through a quantitative analysis of social 





4 “How Extremist Groups Are Using Social Media to Spread Their Ideology, Recruit and Encourage 
Violence,” accessed October 20, 2020, https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/93440-how-extremist-
groups-are-using-social-media-to-spread-their-ideology-recruit-and-encourage-violence?v=preview. 
5 Warren T. Camber. 2017. "The Technology of Statecraft in The Age of Social Media: Idioms of 
Authority and Radicalization in Nigeria Social Communications." Naval Postgraduate School. 
6 Warren, “Explosive Connections?” 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. SOCIAL MEDIA AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Since social media’s global acceptance, scholars and military strategists have tried 
to understand the nexus between collective violence and social media in some societies. 
After two decades of advancement in technology and innovations, social media apps now 
include Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, WeChat, YouTube, and Twitter, all configured 
with algorithms that support social networking that gather profiles of friends and affiliation 
in one service.7 Twitter stands out as the most relevant social media app for research based 
on its breadth and availability, which affords researchers the opportunity to analyze 
sentiments by “opinion mining,” which refers to the use of Natural Language Processing 
to determine the attitude and opinions expressed in online media.8 On the one hand, some 
scholars posit using Twitter sentiment analysis could provide near-real-time predictions of 
events.9 Forecasts of events such as polls, elections, online activities, offline phenomena, 
and collective action increasingly make Twitter a valuable tool for analyzing state and non-
state actors’ sentiments.10 On the other hand, some scholars have argued that a combination 
of social media and other forms of communication like Global System for Mobile 
Communication (GSM), radio, and television transmission forms the best approach for 
analyzing state and non- state actors’ behavior.11  
 
7 “Decoding The Social Media Algorithms In 2019. The Ultimate Guide,” Ste Davies, February 19, 
2019, https://www.stedavies.com/social-media-algorithms-guide/. 
8 Warren T. Camber. 2017. "The Technology of Statecraft in The Age of Social Media: Idioms of 
Authority and Radicalization in Nigeria Social Communications." Naval Postgraduate School. 9 – 15. 
9 Pablo Barberá and Gonzalo Rivero, “Understanding the Political Representativeness of Twitter 
Users,” Social Science Computer Review 33, no. 6 (December 1, 2015): 712–29, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439314558836. 
10 Eytan Bakshy et al., “Everyone’s an Influencer: Quantifying Influence on Twitter,” in Proceedings 
of the Fourth ACM International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining, WSDM ’11 (Hong Kong, 
China: Association for Computing Machinery, 2011), 65–74, https://doi.org/10.1145/1935826.1935845. 
11 Catie Snow Bailard, “Ethnic Conflict Goes Mobile: Mobile Technology’s Effect on the 
Opportunities and Motivations for Violent Collective Action,” Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 3 (May 1, 
2015): 323–37, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314556334. 
4 
With democracies globally attempting to reduce hard power approaches in 
countering violence, social media appears to be an increasingly effective soft power tool. 
This point is also noted by scholars who argue that soft power approaches in countering 
violence creates a stronger foundation for a long-lasting solution to violence than the 
kinetic approach.12 Equally important is the state actors employment of soft power 
approach that  involves mass communication and media with capacity to influence and 
control. Of note is Warren’s research, which states that “mass media infrastructure 
represents one of the most powerful forces for peace and stability in the modern world.”13 
Furthermore, with a combination of Bayesian models, and a structural empirical approach 
combined with constructive theoretical concepts, he provided statistical evidence to show 
that mass media influences the population.14  
Violence experienced in the world includes human activity up to the state level; 
however, collective violence involves groups and non-state actors that could be proxies 
against other non-state actors or states.15 Many scholars studying collective violence try to 
explain the fundamental reasons that elicit a collective response from people with shared 
identities regardless of the size. Statistics have shown that much of the collective violence 
witnessed in the world is directed toward the state by groups mobilized through grievances 
caused by omission or commission of the states.16 In the words of Lar B. Kasper, “There 
may not be definitive evidence as to whether the propensity to make war is innate, but there 
are strong intimations that recourse to collective violence is as old as human society 
itself.”17 
 
12 “What Is Soft Power?,” Soft Power, accessed February 10, 2020, https://softpower30.com/what-is-
soft-power/. 
13 T. Camber Warren, “Not by the Sword Alone: Soft Power, Mass Media, and the Production of State 
Sovereignty,” International Organization 68, no. 1 (January 2014): 113, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818313000350. 
14 Warren, 115. 
15 Roberta Senechal de la Roche, “Collective Violence as Social Control,” Sociological Forum 11, no. 
1 (1996): 97–128, https://www.jstor.org/stable/684953. 
16 Bailard, “Ethnic Conflict Goes Mobile.” 
17 “Collective Violence - an Overview | ScienceDirect Topics,” 3, accessed March 24, 2020, 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/collective-violence. 
5 
Previous works on social media and collective violence from the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS), like the works of Gregory R. Selph, Michael H. Crain, Andrew 
Anderson “Measuring Sentiment Response to Collective Violence Through Social 
Media”18 and Warren, “The Technology of Statecraft in the Age of Social Media: Idioms 
of Authority and Radicalization in Nigerian Social Communication,” demonstrate the use 
of social media technology in analyzing sentiments that cause collective violence in 
Nigeria.19 I will utilize some of the already established data and research in this field  
to develop my research on an informational approach to counter collective violence  
in Nigeria. 
B. INFORMATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING COLLECTIVE 
VIOLENCE 
Strategies are essential for success in any domain, especially when an informational 
approach is required. This study explores suitable information strategies theories that 
support the application of the informational approach. From the military standpoint, Joint 
Concept of Operations in the Informational Environment (JCOIE) captures information as 
a requirement for the U.S/JCOIE to achieve its military end state.20 To complete set 
missions, the military requires models that integrate the IE and the operational environment 
(OE). The information has to be transmitted, received, and understood by the target 
audience correctly, a challenge that has led to the improvement from the transmission-
centric model to the sentient informational model.21 Besides, the sentient information 
model incorporates the role of machines in generating data for analysis that could be 
employed on social media for influence operations.22 Aside from the military approach to 
 
18 Younggue Bae and Hongchul Lee, “Sentiment Analysis of Twitter Audiences: Measuring the 
Positive or Negative Influence of Popular Twitterers,” Journal of the American Society for Information 
Science and Technology 63, no. 12 (2012): 2521–35, https://doi.org/10.1002/asi.22768. 
19 Warren T. Camber. 2017. "The Technology of Statecraft in The Age of Social Media: Idioms of 
Authority and Radicalization in Nigeria Social Communications." Naval Postgraduate School. 9 – 15. 




22 “Jp3-13-2.Pdf,” accessed October 23, 2020, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3-13-2.pdf. 
6 
information strategy, some scholars have contributed to the development of strategy for 
states and the militaries, especially during OIE’s conduct. 
In Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide to Theory and Practice, John 
Arquilla and Doug Borer explain information strategies through three themes: “the rise of 
the information domain and its interplay with military affairs; the growing power of 
networked organizations; and the multidimensional nature of information operations 
themselves.”23 Theories covered in Arquilla and Borer’s study succinctly captured aspects 
that support this study. According to David Ronfeldt, seeing Al-Qaeda from the standpoint 
of religious zealots is incomplete, but exploring the nexus between globalization and 
tribalism allows us to understand how it mutated into a virulent predator.24 Similarly, 
Anthony R. Pratkanis argues for a change in the way IO is conducted by application of 
“consistency and commitment,” social proof, and influence as tools in conducting OIE. He 
argues that consistency reinforces persuasion and guarantees the recipient of information, 
while commitment goes a step ahead to win the hearts, thereby influencing the target 
audience’s behavior. Pratkanis also states that the center of gravity of influence campaigns 
has to be within ethical and legal boundaries, primarily when persuasive communication is 
directed toward a state’s own citizens, it must not contain any form of psychological 
operations and propaganda.25  
The application of information for influence cuts across states and non-state actors 
who sometimes lack the capabilities to measure the effect of penetration and detect 
propaganda. For instance, Robinson Glenn discovered that Al-Qaeda is adept at 
information management and data security, and this leads to his suggestion that a “network-
centric” approach is suitable if OIE is used for counterterrorism counterinsurgency 
(CTCOIN).26 The argument from information strategists to invent effective means of 
persuasion for future application to match new technological advancements, are areas 
 
23 John Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer, Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide to Theory and 
Practice (Routledge, 2007), 2. 
24 David Ronfeldt, “Al Qaeda and Its Affiliates: A Global Tribe Waging Segmental Warfare,” January 
1, 2007, https://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1371.html. 
25 Arquilla and Borer, Information Strategy and Warfare, 56–80. 
26 Arquilla and Borer, 102–10. 
7 
scholars now increasingly research. For instance, Burton Whaley echoed the need for the 
first-class deception to employ other means, not the traditional leaflet drops, loudspeakers, 
and radio propaganda adopted in previous deception and information operation.27 To build 
on the premise of diversifying approaches to target audiences, social media powered by the 
internet presents new ways of influencing audiences. While social media has more 
penetration in certain regions, economic barriers and internet availability are important 
challenges in getting social media information to remote areas except through a transfer of 
the same information through a social network of small groups. Social media also provides 
the information strategist the opportunity for measuring influence through the number of 
searches, likes, followers, messages, and shared links for small-scale blogs and large-scale 
platforms like Twitter and Facebook.28  
Globally the increase in information transfer through various medium is 
categorized by some scholars as a continuous process that require technological and 
nontechnological integrant. The strategist’s overall goal is to have adroitness in 
understanding, creativity, and transmission of information to demoralize one’s opponents 
in the right way. According to Borer’s view, “identifying the right kind of knowledge 
needed for a particular conflict may be the most critical choice the information strategist 
makes.”29 He also considers that a “war of ideas” is an oxymoron, that persuasion rather 
than coercion is the order of the day.30  
C. PERSUASIVE INFORMATION 
The medieval period’s informal methods are different from modern times and will 
change based on societies and technological development. In considering the design of 
information for modern times and how to convey ideas, the knowledge that can influence 
human behavior is critical for success by the originator. According to Schramm Wilbur, 
 
27 “American_intelligence_journa.Pdf,” accessed November 5, 2020, 
https://cdn.ymaws.com/cicentre.com/resource/resmgr/articles/american_intelligence_journa.pdf. 
28 James Kinniburgh and Dorothy Denning, “Blogs and Military Information Strategy,” IO Sphere, 
June 1, 2006, 51, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203945636.ch9. 
29 Arquilla and Borer, Information Strategy and Warfare, 250. 
30 Arquilla and Borer, Information Strategy and Warfare. 
8 
the ability to communicate effectively by coding and decoding information through the 
source, message, and destination principles of communication reduces the redundancy of 
transmitting too much information without getting the accurate message to the receiver.31 
For every piece of information released, the effect must be taken into cognizance; whether 
it will persuade the target audience or create resentment. A critical aspect of information is 
the perception of biases. Emily Spencer states that mitigating individual and group 
decision-making errors by understanding the effects of cognitive biases includes simplified 
information processing strategies that influence the human mind, which cannot process 
extensive information.32 Cognitive biases can such as personal prejudices and optimism 
biases, can also be exploited. In his book “The Psychology of Persuasion,” Robert Cialdini 
explains how to influence people by analyzing human psychology, weapons of influence, 
then commitment, and consistency.33  
One of the critical aspects of ethics and emic behaviors is social proof, which leads 
to the pluralistic ignorance effect. People of the same ethnicity, tribe, religion, or 
association sometimes reify shared values and interest factors that motivate people to be 
influenced in a particular manner. For instance, societies with homogeneous identities, 
sacred values, and authority systems may be more easily influenced by the leaders of that 
society. According to Edward L. Bernays, persuasive information requires both art and 
science to control public minds to accept a particular idea or commodity. To Bernays, the 
essence of propaganda is to “regiment the public mind every bit as much as an army 
regiment their bodies.”34 With divergent views about propaganda’s effect in the 
information disseminated, some take propaganda to connote negativity. In like fashion, 
propaganda is targeted at foreign states and adversaries, while some scholars take it as a 
means to garner the support of the people. For VEOs, propaganda is a key tool for 
 
31 Elihu Katz, “The Process and Effects of Mass Communication. Wilbur Schramm,” American 
Journal of Sociology 61, no. 6 (May 1, 1956): 638–39, https://doi.org/10.1086/221865. 
32 Emily Spencer, Thinking for Impact: A Practical Guide for Special Operations Forces, 2018, 
https://www.deslibris.ca/ID/10098572. 
33 “How to Use Cialdini’s 6 Principles of Persuasion to Boost Conversions,” CXL (blog), June 30, 
2019, https://cxl.com/blog/cialdinis-principles-persuasion/. 
34 “Propaganda by Edward Bernays (1928),” accessed October 23, 2020, 
http://www.historyisaweapon.org/defcon1/bernprop.html. 
9 
information operations in mobilizing support from the people, while delegitimizing state 
actors. Conversely, states can defeat their adversaries by using propaganda as a function to 
advance statecraft policies that involve manipulation, subversion, cooperation, 
privatization, and creation of panic.35  
In recent times there has been an increase in disinformation and misinformation in 
cyberspace to create disorder. Some of the information disseminated in countries are 
PSYOPS, which could be from an adversary country that intends to use the intangible 
power of information to create discord. While the use of PSYOP and deception could be 
fashionable in some places, most democratic states discourage PSYOP on their own 
citizens, just as the U.S. Department of Defense prohibits propaganda and PSYOP on U.S. 
citizens.36 However, the reality is that nation against nation, nation against people, and 
people against people now apply PSYOP and deception even when not in war. Tim Maurer 
also notes this point and argues that states, non-state actors, proxies, and mercenaries \ are 
essential tools for projecting conflicts to achieve national interests in the information 
environment.37  
D. SOCIAL MEDIA AND VIOLENT INFORMATION NETWORKS IN 
NIGERIA 
Social media is now the fastest means of information sharing, supporting the 
transfer of knowledge and technology. Works of literature on information and narratives 
have argued that the power of information shared through social media could positively 
and negatively affect the target audience.38 Social media platforms like peer-to-peer apps 
(P2P)—Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, and Baidu—facilitate both information 
sharing across sovereign boundaries globally except countries with government 
 
35 Daniel Lerner, Propaganda in War and Crisis. (New York: Arno Press, 1972). 
36 “Jp3-13-2.Pdf.” 
37 Tim Maurer, Cyber Mercenaries (Cambridge University Press, 2018). 
38 “Disinformation Operations in Cyber-Space,” Cyber security info note, accessed March 25, 2020, 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/info-notes/disinformation-operations-in-cyber-space. 
10 
censorship.39 Wilson and Richard argued that cyber Jihad and cyber terrorists use a master 
narrative and sub narratives to conduct disinformation through the internet and social 
media platforms.40 In these types of narratives, efforts geared toward radicalizing and 
mobilizing law-abiding citizens’ support to revolt against a legally constituted government. 
Tim Maurer echoes this assessment by identifying the roles cyber proxies, which could be 
state and non-state actors, perform in the cyber domain to undermine nations’ sovereignty 
and peace.41 Maurer further supports this point by elucidating false-flag operations and 
actors’ sophistication to manipulate the population through social media platforms. The 
manipulation of the population against others of different religions and races through social 
media has led to violence witnessed in countries like Nigeria, Iraq, Syria, and Myanmar.42  
Identifying the actors that orchestrate violent information on social media has been 
a daunting challenge for many state actors; the advancement in technology and its attendant 
surge in human application of social media has paved the way for VEOs to disseminate 
extremist information unabatedly. With the sophistication attained by VEOs in the cyber 
domain and social media, it is necessary to formulate an approach in controlling the spread 
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A. HISTORY OF INFORMATION INFLUENCING COLLECTIVE 
VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA  
1. Location 
Nigeria is located in West Africa on the Gulf of Guinea, known to be one of Africa’s 
fastest-growing population and prospective economies.43 Geographically Nigeria has 
923,768 km2, sharing boundaries with Benin, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad republics. The 
climate spans from the rain forest belt from the Atlantic Ocean to the Sahel savannah 
regions in northern Nigeria. In Nigeria, the demography includes over 200 million people 
in 36 states and a Federal Capital Territory sharing a diversity of cultures with over 240 
ethnic groups and three major ethnic groups of Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo.44 Nigeria’s 
heterogeneity and population is a source strength in the region; however, persistent 
incidents of collective violence right from the period after independence in 1960 have been 
the bane to its development. Some scholars attribute the sources of violence in Nigeria to 
poverty, ethnic hatreds, and religious bigotry.45 This study examines the exogenous and 
endogenous factors that influence collective violence in states in Nigeria with recurrent 
collective violence among the population.  
2. Colonial Era 
The British pronouncement that heralded the abolishment of the slave trade was 
penultimate to the decision to control territories in southern Nigeria before the 
amalgamation of Southern and Northern protectorates in 1914 by Lord Frederick Lugard.46 
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The British adopted the indirect rule system, but the system could not unite the salience of 
diversities in religion, ethnicity, and regionality as sources of violence in Nigeria.47 From 
the pre-colonial period to the colonial system of governance, the major ethnic groups in 
Nigeria adopted different forms of administration. For instance, the Hausa and Yoruba 
ethnic groups practiced a centralized approach, while the Igbos adopted a more 
decentralized and acephalous structure.  In particular, the Igbo precolonial system is 
chiefless, meaning it has no single recognized ruler like the Yoruba and Hausa systems, 
which efficiently worked for the British indirect rule.48  
During British rule, the first form of collective violence started with a protest in 
what is known as the “Women War,” also called the “Aba Women’s Riot of 1929,” staged 
by women from the southeastern region of Nigeria. The Aba Women’s Riot challenged 
draconian British laws and taxes imposed by unrecognized traditional rulers appointed by 
the British.49 Since the Aba Women’s Riot, Nigeria witnessed increasing anti-British 
protests and ethnoreligious crises until Nigeria gained independence in 1960. 
3. Post-colonial and Military Era 
Before the Nigerian independence of 1960, the Nigerian people experienced 
violence fueled by false information from the various regions. For example, misleading 
information throughout the 1950s incited skirmishes, mainly misinformation that the 
British would relinquish political power to a particular ethnic group created suspicion and 
competition among the political elites.50 For the Nigerian early political elite to control the 
central government, the political elites required a strong home base. The only feasible 
option of getting support was to resort to appeals based on ethnicity, religion, and resources 
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in each region with the possibility of a coalition with another area.51 Shortly after 
independence, the violence continued unabated as political office holders engaged in ethnic 
chauvinism, religious bigotry, and corruption, eventually leading to Nigeria’s first coup d’ 
etat’ in 1966. The coup plotters claimed they wanted to purge Nigeria of nepotism and 
corruption. Still, they were equally guilty of the same crime by selectively executing only 
politicians from other ethnic groups, thus throwing Nigeria into a civil war from 1967  
to 1970.52  
At the end of the Nigerian civil war, there was a clarion call for “One Nigeria” to 
reunite the various ethnic groups that fought in the war. Aside from the Nigerian civil war, 
the second time Nigeria’s unity was threatened was the foremost religious violence that 
started as a peaceful protest in Kano State Nigeria in 1980. The demand for sharia law to 
be freely practiced in northern Nigeria was spearheaded by a group called Maitatsine, 
which means “one who damns” in Hausa.53 The protest led to a civil disturbance with 
interminable ethnoreligious clashes in northern Nigeria; this threatened the return to 
democracy after 13 years of military rule after the civil war. With a coup d’ etat’ staged in 
1985, the military obliterated Maitatsine, with some followers resurging in 2002 after 
Nigeria returned to another democratic dispensation.54  
4. Democratic Transition 
Other groups involved in collective violence in Nigeria after the end of military rule 
in 2000 are the Niger Delta militants, the movement for the actualization of Biafra’s 
sovereign state (MASSOB), and movement for the emancipation of Niger Delta 
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(MEND).55 From 2009 the country witnessed violent extremist groups such as “Jama’atu 
Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad,” which in Arabic means “people committed to the 
propagation of the Prophets Teachings and Jihad” known as “Boko Haram,” and the 
Islamic State in West African Province (ISWAP).56 Others are the indigenous people of 
Biafra (IPOB) and the Islamic movement in Nigeria (IMN), which was recently proscribed 
by the FGN for mobilizing followers from religious and ethnic affiliation to create 
collective violence against other Nigerians.57  
According to Record, “the guerilla can win simply by not losing, whereas the 
counterinsurgent power can lose by not winning.”58 In the past nine years, the BHT has 
demonstrated to the world that the FGN has not defeated them; this is demonstrated by the 
sect adopting the outbidding strategy with the support it gets from Al Shabab, Al-Qaeda 
Al -Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS.59 In 2015, the AFN regained control of all 15 
LGA earlier captured by the BHT. This is the first time in Nigerian history apart from the 
civil war that parts of the country’s democracy and sovereignty were lost. With external 
VEOs support, BHT built capabilities in the cyberspace domain through the constant 
spread of misinformation, disinformation, hacking, and cybercrime. For instance, Eleni, a 
political scientist, argued that ISIS enjoyed sustained recruitment overseas through 
cyberspace activities.60 The use of radicalized video clips to teach followers is frequently 
sent through the internet to recruit fighters. Similarly, being an Al-Qaeda affiliate, BHT 
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imitated the same strategy, using YouTube and social media to conduct propaganda, 
disinformation, financial crimes for funds, and recruitment.61  
It is essential to mention the use of information by the proponents of violence in 
creating a cognitive bias of categorization among the various religious, ethnic groups in 
Nigeria. For instance, through information transmitted, the difference between the ethnic 
and religious groups are reinforced other than the citizens seeing Nigeria first. I 
hypothesize that the segregation and identities created can be removed with the 
transmission of unifying messages capable of suppressing the categorization created 
among Nigerians. Exploring the forms of anodyne information that reduces the salience of 
emic and ethic categories with the capability to unite Nigerians is imperative for this study 
and sustenance of Nigerian democracy. 
5. The Armed Forces of Nigeria Information Approach  
The Nigerian state has attained 21 years of uninterrupted democracy despite 
daunting issues that have threatened its unity, which could have easily thrown it back to 
the dark days of coups and counter-coups d’état. The AFN has pledged its loyalty to the 
constitution and FGN to protect Nigerians even in the face of myriad collective violence 
incidents, and too sustain nascent Nigerian democracy from groups who want to secede on 
an ethnic basis like the IPBO/MASSOB and MEND who claim the Niger Delta oil 
resources. Other groups are the BHT and ISWAP demanding a caliphate be carved out of 
Nigeria for the complete practice of sharia laws. The AFN has contended with these forces 
since the current democratic transition.  
To sustain Nigeria’s unity, security, and sovereignty, several counterterrorism, 
counterinsurgency (CTCOIN), and counter violent extremism (CVE) approaches have 
been considered, with operations in the informational environment (OIE) forming a key 
part of the overall strategic plan. For instance, the FGN strategy of amnesty granted to 
MEND and Niger Delta Militants resolved a decade of insurgency around the oil rich 
 




region of Nigeria.62 The amnesty, which is a non-kinetic approach, has paved way for peace 
in the Niger Delta region a strategy attributed to be successful in countering insurgency 
that would have plunged Nigeria into economic crisis.  
Conversely, BHT, ISWAP, IPOB, and IMN sustain the fomentation of collective 
violence through various means of communication, especially in cyberspace where VEOs 
exploit social media’s ubiquity in information sharing. While VEOs, like BHT, started 
building cyberspace capabilities through social media in 2010, the Nigerian Army (NA) 
commissioned its cyber command in 2018 to counter VEOs information warfare in 
cyberspace.63 It is important to realize that the NA commenced OIE in 2011 through mass 
communication and social communication for CTCOIN operations while the AFN started 
building a social media presence. To share information with the general public through 
mass media, the AFN encouraged all commanders to leverage news media platforms on 
social media to broadcast counter-narratives to VEOs propaganda. For instance, VEOs 
know that if misinformation and disinformation narratives are not mitigated in cyberspace, 
the credibility of authentic information by the AFN will be eroded. To deny sources the 
ability to undermine cultural, societal, religious, and democratic values, AFN is leveraging 
all possible technologies to ensure its OIE achieves its objectives. One example is BHT 
applying propaganda against the FGN in an encrypted platform to spread narratives 
suggesting the AFN indulges in the indiscriminate killing of citizens on the frontline while 
ignoring the atrocities BHT commits.64 In the same fashion, BHT/ISWAP destroyed a 
village and immediately released a video claiming the AFN killed innocent Nigerians, a 
form of information warfare aimed at defamation of the AFN, and aiming to pit the people 
against the FGN.65 
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The FGN, through the AFN, created the joint task force (JTF), the multinational 
joint task force (MNJTF), and the relationship with states in northeast Nigeria formed the 
civilian joint task force (CJTF).66 Notably, in northwestern Nigeria, JTF OIE recorded a 
massive success following the practical application of a population-centric approach that 
included social media technologies in the operational plans. This was achieved by periodic 
press briefings at the JTF headquarters (HQ) in Kano, encouraging the news media to share 
information from JTF, primarily through their Facebook and Twitter accounts. Through 
JTF OIE in Kano and Katsina states, the JTF gained the population’s support in countering 
collective violence inspired by BHT/ISWAP. While Kano State in 2012 had one of the 
highest rates of improvised explosive device (IED) incidents, the situation changed 
dramatically with the efforts of the JTF OIE, which led to reduction of IED incidents to the 
barest minimum in 2015.67 Although the JTF defeated the VEOs in Kano State, the details 
of the mechanisms that convinced the diverse ethnic, religious groups and how to measure 
the effectiveness of the OIE, requires further study. If better understood, this method could 
be applied in other states in Nigeria and possibly other emerging democracies in the world. 
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IV. RESEARCH METHOD 
A. HYPOTHESES 
This research will leverage insights from existing works relating to social 
communication and collective violence conducted in Nigeria to further understand this 
field. The study examines the capabilities of information shared on social media to 
influence the population’s behavior and to promote peace or lead to collective violence in 
Nigeria. To assess social media influence on behavior, I identify words associated with 
concepts such as “God,” “unity,” and “Nigeria,” which may represent positive information 
that could promote peace in Nigeria. Conversely, I examine words associated with concepts 
such as “bomb” and “violence,” which could incite collective violence. The period of 
study, from August 1, 2013, to July 31, 2014, is crucial for analysis because this time 
coincides with the period in which the Boko Haram Terrorist (BHT) group was mobilizing 
support in northeastern Nigeria through various informational operations.  
Firstly, I hypothesize that spatio-temporal units with occurrence of violence in the 
previous months will more likely experience violence the current month (Hypothesis 1). 
Secondly, I hypothesize that spatio-temporal units with more positive discourse will more 
likely experience a lower level of violence (Hypothesis 2a). I further hypothesize that 
spatio-temporal units with more violent discourse will more likely experience a higher 
level of violence. (Hypothesis 2b). Finally, I hypothesize that the effect of some variables 
in the regression that will deepened on the level another variable. We should expect that 
the effect of “God” discourse will differ depending on other types of discourse that are 
present in the same spatio-temporal regions. In particular, I hypothesize that the effect of 
“God” discourse will depend on “unity” discourse (Hypothesis 3a), creating lower levels 
of violence when both forms of discourse are present. God is respected in Nigeria 
regardless of the religious beliefs particularly among worshippers of the two major 
religious beliefs in Nigeria, which are Islam and Christianity.68 While “God” is a concept 
that can sometimes be interpreted in divisive ways, the “God” factor can also sometimes 
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drive prosocial cohesion in Nigeria. Even though there are noticeable differences in the 
practice of the major religions, a unifying factor is both religions trace their roots to the 
Abrahamic tradition. While VEOs like the BHT and ISWAP maintain their extremist 
narrative, a larger part of Nigerian society has evolved from fanatical beliefs to more liberal 
religious acceptance that fosters the inter-religious and cultural cohesion. Furthermore, I 
hypothesize that “unity” discourse will alter the effect of prior violence in Nigeria 
(Hypothesis 3b). With the evolution of inter-tribal and religious acceptance, the cultural 
perception in Nigeria has evolved from the illusions of asymmetric insights and 
misconceptions about groups. With more discourse about “unity” it is expected that the 
barriers of categories among Nigerians will be partially ameliorated which will reduce the 
effect of prior violence in the country, making it easier to transition from violence to peace. 
The unit of analysis for the research is a grid-cell width of approximately 50km by month. 
The measure of 50km affords this study the ability to track violence across state boundaries 
including Kano, Maiduguri, Lagos, and the most remote areas in Nigeria. 
B. RESEARCH DATA 
1. Describing the Variables  
To provide evidence for these hypotheses, first, we need to know the baseline level 
of collective violence before testing the independent variables and control variables. The 
process starts with the data collected from the Armed Conflict Locator and Event Data 
(ACLED) database for an accurate analysis of conflict events located within Nigeria.69 The 
independent and control variables are included to support the empirical investigation with 
data collected from online sources like NPS archived Twitter data and other open data 
sources relevant to analyze the relationship between influential information and collective 
Violence in Nigeria. In order to generate geospatial analysis in this study population and 
location, the Gridded Population of the World (GPW) and Socioeconomic Data and 
Application Center (SEDAC) were applied.70 Others are the Geographically Based 
 
69 “ACLED,” ACLED, accessed October 2, 2020, https://acleddata.com/. 
70 “Gridded Population of the World (GPW), v4 | SEDAC,” accessed October 2, 2020, 
https://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/collection/gpw-v4. 
21 
Economic Data (G-Econ) used to generate the GDP and GDPP in Nigeria.71 For better 
visualization of the geospatial analysis, Nigerian shapefiles were added to the 
investigation.72 In Figure 1, the 36 states in Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory are 
shown. 
 
Figure 1. Map of Nigeria Showing the 36 States and Federal Capital Territory.73 
2. Dependent Variable  
The dependent variable is generated from the ACLED database to measure the 
count of violent events producing fatalities against state and non-state actors from activities 
other than war in Nigeria.74 ACLED provides this study the chance of analyzing events in 
the database by date of occurrence and area of interest that identifies the longitude and 
latitude within Nigeria. In Figure 2, ACLED is reduced to capture violent event occurrence 
in Nigeria from August 1, 2013, through July 31, 2014, to match the dates of the NPS 
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Twitter dataset period for this research.75  Similarly, in Figure 2, the recorded events from 
the ACLED data are plotted as blue points. For the dependent variable to reflect the unit of 
analysis of this study, the spatial points are converted to grid-cells through analytic grid 
processing, by counting the number of violent events and fatalities within each grid-cell-
month unit. The grid-cells are color-coded red to yellow, where high red levels represent 
high fatalities, and low levels are yellow and white means no record of violence. From the 
plots in Figure 2, we can see that Borno State and Plateau states in the northeastern part of 
Nigeria have higher violent fatalities depicted by more concentration of dark brown and 
red in the grid-cells of that location than any other part of Nigeria. This is reflective of 
events in Nigeria at the time, owing to collective violence of BHT and the sectarian crisis 
in the Plateau states. 
 
Figure 2. Violent Events and Fatalities in Nigeria, 2013–2014 
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3. Independent Variables  
a. Nigerian Population 
The Nigerian population is recorded as one of the fastest-growing populations 
globally. To measure the relationship between population and violence, it is imperative to 
measure population density, which is the number of individuals per unit area. This study 
used the Gridded Population of the World (GPW) fourth version (GPWv4), that models 
the distribution of the human population (counts and densities) on a continuous global 
raster surface.76 The GPW provides a spatially disaggregated population layer that is 
compatible with other social, economic, and remote sensing data sets within Nigeria. Raster 
grids measure population density consistent with national censuses and population 
registers, or alternative sources in rare cases where no census or record was available  
in Nigeria. All estimates of population density have also been nationally adjusted to 
population totals from the United Nation’s World Population Prospects. The population 
density variable is log-transformed to account for diminishing marginal effects in  
areas with higher population distribution. Figure 3 shows the smoothed densities of the  
Nigerian population, showing areas with high-density population color coded red and low 
with yellow.  
 
Figure 3. Nigerian Heat Map showing Population Distribution 
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b. Nigerian Wealth 
The gross domestic product (GDP) variable for this study is used to measure 
whether the total value of goods and services produced in different regions of Nigeria will 
impact the level of violence. Leveraging previous studies that examined the correlation 
between wealth, poverty, and violence, I derived this variable from the G-Econ dataset, 
which provides g a geophysical based data set on economic activity Nigeria and other 
countries in the world. The primary metric is the regional equivalent of gross domestic 
product per capita, and the gross cell product (GCP) is measured at a 1-degree longitude 
by 1-degree latitude resolution at a global scale.77 The GDP independent variable is log-
transformed to account for diminishing marginal effects in areas with higher GDP. In 
Figure 4, we can see from the plot that red implies more GDP per capita and reduces to 
light yellow, signifying the lowest GDP per capita by grid-cell. The plot has more areas 
with red at the southern and north-central regions of Nigeria, symbolizing higher average 
wealth with the brown to yellow scattered around other parts of the country that implies 
lower average wealth. 
 
Figure 4. Nigerian GDP 
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c. Social Media Analysis  
For this study is I used aggregated counts of social media messages generated from 
the NPS Twitter archive, which were then transformed into grid-cell month units for 
analyzing the effect of information on violence (see Figures 5 and 6). The starting point for 
the analysis is a 10% random sample of all messages transmitted over the Twitter network 
between August 2013 and July 2014. To identify social media influence on behavior, words 
such as “unity,” “good,” “all,” and “God” were used to measure positive information that 
could promote peace in Nigeria. Conversely, words such as “bad,” “bomb,” and, more 
specific location mentions were used to measure negative information that could incite 
collective violence.  
 
Figure 5. Population Density and Violence in Nigeria. 
In addition, I include a key control variable measuring the total number of tweets 
by grid-cell-month in Nigeria over the study period. It is essential to control for overall 
communication by using the volume of the total tweets to test the integrity of additional 
effects seen for a specific style of discourse. This is to ensure that the results are not merely 
tracking fluctuations in aggregate messaging rates, but rather differences in the relative 
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rates of appearance of different forms of message content. In Figure 6, the total tweets  
in Nigeria are represented by grid-cell, with higher volumes in red and lower volumes  
in yellow. 
 
Figure 6. Social Media Traffic in Nigeria 
The period from 2013 to 2014 is selected to capture the introduction of information 
in the operational environment by the FGN in countering collective violence. Based on 
previous studies in this field, we measured the causes of violence in Nigeria by running 
software that can make judgments of geographic location from unstructured text in Twitter 
user profiles. I relied on the NPS licensed Twitter archive, covering the period August 2013 
to July 2014, with a database that consists of a 10 percent random samples of all Twitter 
messages (about 40 terabytes of textual data), which contains approximately three billion 
separate statements that can be searched for textual patterns. The derived counts enable 
this study to geospatially determine the tweets’ location and correlate them with 
information about the occurrence of violent events in Nigeria. 
4. Text Processing 
The data mining commenced by compiling different search terms into a dictionary 
to be applied across the archive. To achieve this, a large bounding box across central Africa, 
which includes Nigeria and all its neighbors (longitude: -20 to 43, latitude: -7 to 30), is 
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generated. Then we recorded messages matching any of the search terms from the 
dictionary and its location and time. Counts of search terms matching any categories were 
recorded on a global grid of square latitude/longitude cells of 0.01 degrees. Finally, the 
data is aggregated into unique grid-cell-month units, using the 50km grid cells visualized 
above across Nigeria. 
5. Concept Mining 
I focused on discursive references to particular concepts that can be defined 
consistently across Nigeria’s diverse cultures. These discourse categories are: (1) 
references to peace and unity in Nigeria, (2) references to violence, and (3) references to 
God, as these concepts are written in the main languages in Nigeria, to produce a 
multilingual dictionary of terms recognized by the majority of the ethnic groups in Nigeria. 
In particular, the official language taught and spoken in Nigeria is English, while French, 
Yoruba, Igbo, Hausa, and Arabic are either mandatory or optional in some academic 
institutions in Nigeria. Cultural heterogeneity can be a problem for communication in 
Nigeria, especially information that involves sacred values attached to ethnicity and 
religion. Therefore, I focused on the concepts of Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa as well as God 
with mention of Christianity and Muslims in the basic search terms. The three major tribes 
have many residents across Nigeria, while God cuts across all tribes captured in this study. 
For instance, I identified five ways “God” is expressed in the five languages spoken in 
Nigeria which starts with the English expression of God, Allah, هللا, Dieu, Chineke, and 
Ọlọrun the Yoruba version. The full list of terms and cross-translation can be found in 
Appendix A. 
6. Lagged Variables 
Lagged variables were also included in the models to capture the effects of events 
from previous time periods, in a given grid cell. Using data from the ACLED database, 
prior violence was measured in several different ways. First, “Violence (lag),” records the 
count of violent events in the previous grid-cell month. Second, “Violence (mean),” records 
the mean count of violent events over the previous six months. Finally, “Violent Deaths” 
records the total number of violent fatalities in a given grid cell over the previous three 
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years, while “Distance to Violence” records the distance to the nearest violent event over 
the previous three years. Lagged version of the social media variables were also included 
in some models, to clarify whether the effects of different forms of discourse arise prior to 
the outbreak of violence, or in response to violence. These variables record the same term 
counts, but from the previous grid-cell-month. 
7. Research Question 
How can influence in the information environment be used to reduce collective 





This study utilizes Poisson regression models based on geospatial analysis of
variables that measure counts of events to determine the association between the dependent 
and independent variables. For this study, the regression models are designed to examine 
events from August 2013 to July 2014 in Nigeria. The unit of analysis for the regression 
model is set at the grid-cell level, with a grid-cell width of approximately 50 kilometers 
(0.5 degrees latitude/longitude). All independent variables were log-transformed to reduce 
the influence of extreme values. 
Table 1 reports the regression results from five models, with Model 1 created as the 
baseline that shows the relationship between the dependent variable of violence and 
independent variables that include population density, distance to violence, deaths, GDP 
per capita, previous months’ violence, and total tweets. While in Model 2, additional 
variables are included to capture the discourse categories of “Bomb,” “Nigeria,” “God,” 
and “Unity,” with this final category comprising counts of terms referring to unity, 
harmony, and/or peace. In Model 3, I include a multiplicative interaction term between 
“unity” discourse and the prior month’s level of violence, and an interaction term between 
“unity” discourse and “God” discourse. Model 4 repeats the structure of Model 2, but 
instead uses lagged versions of the social media variables, and while Model 5 mirrors 
Model 3, but includes lagged versions of the social media variables along with the 
multiplicative interactions.  
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Table 1. Poisson Regression Nigerian Violence and Twitter Discourse 
Dependent variable: 
Violence 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Violence (Lag) 0.293*** 0.276*** 0.531*** 0.263*** 0.504*** 
(0.058) (0.057) (0.070) (0.058) (0.070) 
“Unity” -0.247*** 0.066
(0.076) (0.115) 
“Unity” (Lag) -0.188** 0.332***
(0.080) (0.123) 
Violence (Lag) x “Unity” -0.130***
(0.023)
Violence (Lag) x “Unity” (Lag) -0.120***
(0.022)
“God” 0.101 0.115 
(0.072) (0.074) 
“God” x “Unity” -0.032**
(0.013)
“God” (Lag) 0.156** 0.199*** 
(0.074) (0.076) 
“God” (Lag) x “Unity” (Lag) -0.063***
(0.015)
“Nigeria” 0.297*** 0.306*** 
(0.046) (0.047) 
“Nigeria” (Lag) 0.187*** 0.197*** 
(0.050) (0.051) 
“Bomb” 0.080* 0.136*** 
(0.048) (0.049) 
“Bomb” (Lag) 0.046 0.122** 
(0.049) (0.051) 
Total 0.029 -0.131*** -0.179*** 0.006 -0.021
(0.019) (0.040) (0.043) (0.020) (0.020) 
Total (Lag) 0.034** 0.010 0.010 -0.105*** -0.161***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.037) (0.040) 
31 
 Dependent variable:   
 Violence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
Population  0.002 0.033 0.086* 0.023 0.086* 
 (0.045) (0.046) (0.050) (0.046) (0.049)       
GDP 0.171** 0.116 0.121 0.145** 0.161** 
 (0.071) (0.073) (0.076) (0.073) (0.075)       
Distance to Violence -0.291*** -0.337*** -0.301*** -0.334*** -0.312*** 
 (0.041) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044)       
Violent Deaths 0.218*** 0.244*** 0.235*** 0.232*** 0.226*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)       
Violence (Mean) 1.011*** 0.924*** 0.928*** 0.967*** 0.931*** 
 (0.087) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089)       
Constant -1.748*** -1.565*** -1.950*** -1.567*** -1.938*** 
 (0.219) (0.234) (0.248) (0.230) (0.243)  
Observations 4,140 4,140 4,140 4,140 4,140 
Log Likelihood -2,373.834 -2,344.402 -2,323.839 -2,359.779 -2,333.243 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,765.669 4,714.805 4,677.679 4,745.558 4,696.485 
Note: *p**p***p<0.01 
B. FINDINGS—POSITIVE DISCOURSE IS ASSOCIATED WITH REDUCED 
VIOLENCE  
1. Model 1 
From the estimates in Model 1, we can see that violence from the prior month, 
violence over the last six months, and violent deaths over the previous three years, each 
returned highly statistically significant positive coefficients (p < 0.01). This indicates that 
higher levels of these variables are associated with higher levels of violence in Nigeria, as 
expected in Hypothesis 1. Conversely, distance to prior violence had a highly statistically 
significant negative coefficient (p < 0.01) meaning the farther you are from the incidence 
of violence the likelihood violence will be reduced (see Figure 7). In addition, GDP and 
Total (lag) had significant positive coefficients (p < 0.05), indicating that violence in 
Nigeria tends to correlate with higher levels of wealth and activity.  
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Figure 7. Effect of Distance to Prior Violence. 
2. Model 2 
In Model 2, social media variables are included for the current period, to capture 
the discourse categories of “Unity,” “Nigeria,” “God” and “Bomb.” In this model, the 
mention of “God” returned a statistically insignificant result, and “Bomb” had a moderately 
significant positive coefficient (p < 0.1), while “Nigeria” returned a highly statistically 
significant positive coefficient (p < 0.01). This means that the more messages about 
“Nigeria” the more violence is experienced in some parts of Nigeria (see Figure 8). In 
contrast, “Unity” returned a highly statistically significant negative coefficient (p < 0.01), 
which demonstrates that in regions with more messages about the concept of unity in 
Nigeria there is a reduction of the occurrence of violence, as predicted by Hypothesis 2a 
(see Figure 9).  
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Figure 8. Effect of “Nigeria” Discourse 
 
Figure 9. Effect of “Unity” Discourse 
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3. Model 3 
Model 3 expands the specification to include the interaction terms. From the 
estimates, we can see that population becomes statistically significant (p < 0.05), while the 
distance to violence, violent deaths, the violence of the previous month, and the last six 
months, all report highly statistically significant coefficients (p < 0.01). These findings 
further support Hypothesis 1, demonstrating that prior violence is systematically associated 
with higher levels of subsequent violence, even when holding constant the effects of 
population, wealth, and communication. In addition, the positive coefficient for “Bomb” 
(p < 0.01) provides support for Hypothesis 2b, indicating that violent discourse is 
associated with violent behavior. 
The results for the interaction terms of Violence (Lag) x “Unity” and “God” x 
“Unity” in the current month both returned highly statistically significant negative 
coefficients (p < 0.01). In Figure 10, the predicted effects from Model 3 are plotted, with 
the level of “God” discourse on the x-axis, and the level of “Unity” discourse shown on 
the color bar. Note that the line’s slope is changing as we change the level of “Unity”. This 
shows that “God” has different effects depending on the level of “Unity”. We can see that 
the effect of “God” on the x-axis, is reducing violence when unity discourse is at higher 
levels, but increasing violence when unity discourse is at zero. This supports Hypothesis 
2a and Hypothesis 3a, by showing that more unifying discourse may be able to counteract 
the effects of religious rhetoric that would otherwise cause violence. Figure 8 shows the 
interaction between discourse in the current month and violence in the previous month. 
The results show a dampening effect of “Unity” discourse reducing violence. While the 
general understanding from the existing literature is that violence leads to more violence, 
the results from this model indicate that unifying discourse tends to limit this spiral of 
violence. Moreover, given the low AIC score for Model 3 compared with other models in 
Table 1, we can conclude that this model provides highest predictive accuracy, and 
therefore the best basis for testing our hypotheses.  
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Figure 10. Interactive Effect of “God” and “Unity” Discourse 
4. Models 4 and 5 
One may be concerned that the results reported above could be driven by reverse 
causation. This means that it could be that violence is impacting discourse rather than 
discourse impacting violence. In an attempt to try to address the concern, I ran two 
additional models using lagged versions of the independent variables (lagged by one 
month), as reported in Models 4 and 5. When we see in the additional Models 4 and 5 that 
the lagged version of the coefficient remains statistically significant, this provides evidence 
that the level of discourse from last month is impacting the behavior for this month, which 
would not be expected if the results were driven entirely by reverse causation. Comparing 
Models 2 and 4, we see that “Unity” had a negative effect, both in the current period as 
well as in the lagged period. Similarly, comparing Models 3 and 5 (see Figures 10 and 11), 
we can see that the coefficients for the interaction between “Unity” and “God” and the 
interaction between “Unity” and last month’s violence, both remain negative and strongly 
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statistically significant (p < 0.01). These results provide additional evidence in support of 
Hypotheses 2 and 3b, by demonstrating that the associations between discourse and 
violence are unlikely to have been driven entirely by reverse causation. 
 
 
Figure 11.  Interactive Terms between Violence Lag and Unity. 
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VI. VISUALIZING INFLUENCE NETWORKS IN NIGERIA 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What can the structure of the conversation network in Nigeria reveal about key 
actors? 
B. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
One of the methods suitable for analyzing network structure, actors, ties, and groups 
is through social network analysis (SNA). To analyze influence networks in Nigeria, I 
started with a Nigerian retweet network (NRN) dataset, gathered through the Twitter API. 
I then used SNA topographic metrics to better understand the network structure. Specific 
hashtags with reference to retweets conversations on ISWAP, BHT, and Nigeria, and others 
were searched.78 The specific hashtags and Twitter accounts utilized are reported in 
Appendix A2. The data were pulled from the REST API by generating “timelines” of 
approximately 3,200 tweets for each account selected. While different edges like follows, 
mention, tweets, and retweets exist, this study limits its boundary to retweets of the selected 
search terms from January 1, 2015, to August 7, 2020. The nodes in the network represent 
actors, while the edges are the ties between the actors, which are the numbers of retweets. 
This study’s metrics focus on centrality, topography, and cohesive subgroups to give 
further insights into conversations that incite violent behaviors among citizens in Nigeria.  
C. NETWORK STRUCTURE 
1. Topographical Metrics 
The NRN Nigeria VEO network is filtered by extracting the giant component from 
the main network. In Figure 12 below, the filtered NRN giant component network nodes 
are sized by degree centrality while the nodes and edges connecting the nodes are colored 
by the same measure.  
 




Figure 12. NRN Giant Component Nodes Sized by Degree Centrality 
Table 2 further explains the network topography by looking at the giant 
component’s network size, which is 17,291. The average degree calculates the connection 
among actors within the network; for this network, the average degree is 1.378 generated. 
This means that on average, there is at least one connection between every actor within the 
network analyzed. To give the analyst more understanding about the frequency of 
interaction analyzed through the edges in the network, the average weighted degree 
calculates that the average sum of the weights of edges connected to a node in NRN is 
2.072. Next, the diameter of the NRN network is seven, which represents the number of 
steps from one end of the network to the other. Given that diameter refers to the longest 
geodesic and could indicate how dispersed a network is, most network diameters are a 
function of network size, suggesting a larger network will have a larger diameter and 
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smaller the same.79 Going by the diameter score, this network could be relatively 
decentralized, given the number of steps it takes to get from one end to the other in the 
network. In addition, the average path length of the network is 1.562, meaning there is 
some form of clustering within the network that is shortening the overall path distance. 
This implies in the NRN we expect to see clusters of nodes within the network with the 
opportunities for further analysis of subgroups conversation. For this network, the average 
path length implies interconnectivity among actors that make the network tight and 
cohesive. Overall, the network looks relatively spread out, but the clustering drives the 
average path distance smaller, causing some dense areas within the network.  
Table 2. Nigerian Violence Retweet Network Topography Scores 











17291 1.378 1.562 2.072 7 
 
1. Centrality Measures 
Centrality measures are important to understand the relationship between the actors 
in the network and the ties. For the analyst to identify the central actor responsible for the 
flow of information in the NRN directed network, the adoption of indegree, outdegree, 
hubs and authority is employed to analyze the centrality of actors. As the name implies, 
indegree considers the actors that have direct incoming ties while outdegree accounts for 
actors that have direct outgoing ties.80 For instance in Table 3 EdehAlexi had the highest 
 
79 “Understanding Dark Networks - By Daniel Cunningham & Sean Everton & Philip Murphy 
(Paperback) : Target,” 85–87, accessed October 25, 2020, https://www.target.com/p/understanding-dark-
networks-by-daniel-cunningham-sean-everton-philip-murphy-paperback/-/A-80823068. 
80 “Understanding Dark Networks - By Daniel Cunningham & Sean Everton & Philip Murphy 
(Paperback) : Target,” 146. 
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in-degree score of 1469 and GameD with a score of 262 is the highest for out-degree. In 
addition to the centrality measures for this study, it is imperative to identify the sources of 
information disseminated on the NRN with algorithms that analyze the hubs and 
authorities, as originally designed by Jon Kleinberg to rank web pages. To start with, an 
actor’s hub score is a function of how many pages the actor points to (like outdegree 
centrality), weighted by whether the actor points to high or low scoring authorities.81  
Next is an actor’s authority score is a function of how many choices the actor receives  
(like indegree centrality), weighted by whether those choices come from high or low 
scoring hubs.82 
 
Figure 13. Network Nodes Colored by Modularity  
 
81 Jon M Kleinberg, “Authoritative Sources in a Hyperlinked Environment,” n.d., 34. 
82 “HITS Algorithm - Hubs and Authorities on the Internet,” accessed November 19, 2020, 
http://pi.math.cornell.edu/~mec/Winter2009/RalucaRemus/Lecture4/lecture4.html. 
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In the NRN, a good hub is an actor that points to many good authorities and a good 
authority is one that points to many good hubs. EdehAlexi for the second time scored the 
highest on the authority column with 0.6370, while Obi210 is the highest for the hubs (see 
Table 3).  
Table 3. NRN Actors Ranked by Centrality Nigerian Retweets 


































































EdehAlexi appears to be a central actor in the NRN when the highest in-degree and 
authority scores are considered, indicating that he is an important source of information 
dissemination in the NRN. In this network, his conversation is more on BHT and IPOB 
activities. It is important to mention that Mazi Nnamdi Kanu (mazinna), officially known 
as the IPOB high priest, and founder is at fourth place on the in-degree metric and third in 
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authority. Next are Mohdrcd and Sahara, who focus on retweeting issues that affect 
Nigeria’s unity and coexistence. For instance, the owner of Saraha Press was recently 
released from jail on bond for inciting civil disturbance by calling for a revolution through 
his influence on social media. In Figure 14, the NRN actors are labeled by the size measure 
of degree to show the prominent actor’s location and the clusters around these actors within 
the network.  
  
Figure 14. NRN Sized and Colored by Degree 
2. Cohesive Subgroups 
One important metric for analyzing cohesive subgroups is modularity, which 
focuses on community detection within a network by identifying clusters that show a 
pattern of internal interactions. The NRN has a modular network with modularity of 0.833 
and 51 groups with the nodes connecting to sub-conversations that create different clusters, 
as shown in Figure 6 below.  
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D. TEXT ANALYSIS  
The most effective method of identifying the conversation in each cluster is through 
topic modeling, which is an unsupervised form of machine learning that looks for 
underlying patterns in data. I utilized Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) to identify hidden 
topics in the NRN that drives each cluster and the actors dominating such discussion. To 
identify the topics and themes that occur in the NRN, LDA models are used to gather 
patterns from a document. In each document, this approach identifies the important words 
based on reoccurrence, and subsequently, these words are grouped by percentages and 
topics.  
Table 4. Topic Modeling 
Modularity Class Cluster Names Topic Numbers and Assigned Labels 
6 Moses Agbo 12 (BHT, Biafraexit) 
29 (BHT Releases) 
39 (Donald Trump & Nnamdi Kanu) 
28 Human Angle 11 (Game Development) 
28 (Indigenous Games) 
12 Chidi Odinaka 33 (Welfare and Health) 
47 (Covid-19 in Nigeria) 
7 Edeh Alex 13 (President Buhari) 
16 Sahara Reporters 46 (Ndume and BHT) 
49 (Buhari’s Administration) 
4 Mazi Nnamdi 
Kanu 
2 (USA Discourse) 
12 (BHT, Biafraexit) 
39 (Donald Trump Nnamdi Kanu) 
9 Ottotgs/Humangle 17 (ISWAP News) 
24 (BHT Videos) 
13 Mohd RCD 26 (Muslim Festivals) 
1 Khamenei_ir 34 (Unity in Nigeria) 
 
Table 3 describes the modularity groups built around specific topics and the 
percentage that each topic composes of the messages in each modularity group. The nine 
largest modularity groups are selected for analysis of topics that dominate each individual 
44 
modularity group. The primary topics are included for each subgroup, which can have 
second and third topic attributes. In Table 3, the nine largest modularity groups are named 
after the actor with the highest degree score. For instance, in Figure 10, Mazi Moses Agbo 
is the actor with the highest degree in that modularity cluster. See Appendix A4 for the list 
of actors with the highest degree in each modularity class and their percentages. In Figure 
15, the words on the y-axis show the top concepts for each topic.83 Correspondingly, the 
x-axis “beta” shows the topic-word density which could be high or low depending on the 
frequency in the document. In addition, each modularity group focuses more on certain 
topics, ranked by percentages; for this study, a maximum of three topics were allowed for 
each modularity class. Details of the topics and the frequency of words contained in the 
group are in Appendix A3.  
 
Figure 15. Latent Dirichlet Allocation Chart 
 
83 “Sklearn. Decomposition. Latent Dirichlet Allocation — Scikit-Learn 0.23.2 Documentation,” 
accessed November 19, 2020, https://scikit-
learn.org/stable/modules/generated/sklearn.decomposition.LatentDirichletAllocation.html. 
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1. Subgroup Merged with Text 
In Figure 16 Mazi Moses Agbo is identified as the most central actor in this 
subgroup based on the measure of average degree for every actor in this cluster. The nodes 
and edges are sized and colored by degree with different nodes having different colors 
based on individual degree scores. For instance, the actors reflected with the purple nodes 
all have a score of 56 percent higher than the nodes with dark Green that scored 1.63 
percent from the degree scores of this subgroup. Mazi Moses’s cluster topics are 12,29 and 
39 that centered around BHT, the main terrorist group in Nigeria, and Biafra, exit a 
movement for the secession of Biafra from Nigeria. Other topics identified in this cluster 
includes topics on President Donald Trump and Mazi Nnamdi Kanu.  
  
Figure 16. Mazi Moses Agbo Subgroup 
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Ottotgs and Humangle clusters could mean more to the analyst when considering 
the topics dominating the cluster. Before discussing the topics, the nodes are sized by 
average degree with the edges colors generated based on the nodes connections to topics 
discussed within the cluster. The LDA model identified two prominent topics that include 
17 and 24 having conversations about BHT and ISWAP. This means that the actors in this 
subgroup are concerned about the activities of VEOs in Nigeria and possibly the counter 
measures.  
  
Figure 1. Ottotgs/Humangle Subgroup 
In Figure 18 we see a cluster of media agencies in Nigeria appraently retweeting 
inforamtion from one another. Sahara Repoters dominates this subgroup following the 
assessment of the average degree of all the actors. Almost all the nodes have the same color 
because Sahara influences bulk of the information share within the cluster such as 
“revolutionnowNg” and “Yelesowore” are also connected to the same actor. The LDA 
model identified two main topics for this cluster: the first is 46 that focuses on Senator 
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Ndume and the second is 49 that focuses mainly on President Buhari’s admistration. The 
conspicuos presence of cetain groups such as “revolutionnowNg” in this subgroup provides 
the analyst an important visualition of the followers of this compagin.  
 
Figure 2. Sahara/Reporters Subgroup  
Mazi Nnamdi Kanu is the leader of the proscribed IPBO wanted by the FGN. In 
Figure 19, we can see that almost all nodes apart from a few blue edges show that everyone 
in this subgroup are actively involved with the sharing of information with Kanu. The main 
topics in this subgroup are 2 (USA Discourse); 12 (BHT, Biafraexit); 39 (Donald Trump 
Nnamdi Kanu). The question that comes to mind is why would Nnamdi Kanu be very 
concerned about the USA and President Trump? One possible answer to attract 
international attention especially from the USA to recognize IPOB’s agitation toward 
secession from Nigeria. It is expedient to note that IPOB adopts a violent approach just like 
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the BHT and other VEOs that want to create an Islamic country out of Nigeria through 
collective violence. The leader IPOB knows the right thing to do is to channel this demand 
through the various states assembly to the Nigerian National Assembly then a referendum 
is deliberated to determine if the people truly want to remain in Nigeria or become an 
independent country.  
  
Figure 3. Mazi Nnamdi Kanu Subgroup 
E. SUMMARY  
Through this analysis of social media networks in Nigeria, it was discovered that 
some actors and clusters are grouped based on the topics they discuss, which can be a form 
of affiliation. Violent topics point to the fact that disinformation and extremist information 
are widely shared in Nigerian social media. No doubt, social media is beneficial to 
humanity, but it comes with its attendant dangers such as exploitation by non-state actors 
like VEOs that challenge the sovereignty of states. In Nigeria, these actors can operate on 
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social media platforms as false flags and proxies while spreading disinformation and 
extremist doctrines, as well as psychological operations to recruit and sow discord among 
patriotic citizens. This exercise applied three SNA metrics in analyzing retweets from 
Nigeria that focus on particular VEOs. Insights derived from the SNA reveal that the 
network structure shows strong clustering and segregation between groups within the 
network and brings to fore the need for identifying elements of conversations that cause 
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VII. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
A. CONCLUSION 
To counter to collective violence in Nigeria requires knowing the key forms of 
influential information that can change the behavior of diverse ethnic groups. Building on 
previous research in this field, this study expanded the search to identify key concepts that 
the AFN can employ in OIE to counter collective violence. The results generated from this 
study provide evidence that discourse about “God” and “Unity” will reduce the occurrence 
of collective violence in Nigeria.  
Several hypotheses were considered. The first hypothesis stated that spatio-
temporal units with occurrence of violence in the previous months will more likely 
experience violence the current month (Hypothesis 1). Secondly, I considered that spatio-
temporal units with more positive discourse will more likely experience a lower level of 
violence (Hypothesis 2a). I further hypothesized that spatio-temporal units with more 
violent discourse will more likely experience a higher level of violence. (Hypothesis 2b). 
More complex hypotheses were also included to test for interdependencies between 
variables in the regressions. In this way, I hypothesized that the effect of “God” discourse 
will depend on “unity” discourse (Hypothesis 3a). Furthermore, I hypothesized that “unity” 
discourse will dampen the effect of prior violence in Nigeria (Hypothesis 3b). 
The results presented in the regression table provided clear evidence that mere 
discourse of “Nigeria” is associated with increases in the occurrence of collective violence 
in the country. In contrast, the results show that discourse about “God” and “unity” will 
reduce violence in Nigeria, when they occur together in high levels. Moreover, additional 
evidence showed that these variables also have strong lagged effects from prior months, to 
address potential concerns about reverse causation. Furthermore, the results showed that 
“unity” discourse reduces the impact of prior violence from the previous month, perhaps 
providing a means of escaping the frequent spiral of violence inducing violence.  
To support the study of efforts to build influence capabilities in the information 
environment, SNA was applied to visualize discourse related to Nigerian VEOs on Twitter. 
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With the application of three SNA metric measures and topic modelling, the results show 
how clusters of actors are driven by clusters of topics. The key topics include discourse 
about politics, religion, welfare, and the development of new ideas within Nigeria. From 
the analysis conducted, we can see that some important subgroups are active in the 
dissemination of information with violent contents especially on BHT and ISWAP while 
other subgroups share more educative information. This approach, combined with the 
previous methods used to identify concepts in social media that incite violence and promote 
peace, provides the AFN with new opportunities to build counter narratives when 
conducting operations to generate influence in the information environment. 
B. FURTHER RESEARCH  
The areas that require further research includes the inclusion of additional discourse 
categories representing the diverse religious and ethnic groups in Nigeria. Results from 
these categories would provide more evidence about the areas not captured in this research. 
With the uneven distribution of wealth in Nigeria, the use of Twitter also appears to have 
some limitation in capturing the general effect of information shared throughout Nigeria. 
This means that future studies should consider the need to run analysis of other applications 
on social media such as Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, considering the wide usage 
of these apps in Nigeria. Aside from social media, efforts should also be made to gather 
data from the mass communications media in Nigeria, such as the Nigerian Television 
Authority and radio stations, which could provide evidence of the effects of penetration of 
shared information. 
It is also imperative that contiguous countries to Nigeria are considered in the 
analysis of countering collective violence through an informational approach. Particularly, 
given that the Lake Chad Basin Commission has been saddled with the responsibility to 
coordinate the Multi National Joint Task Force, the inclusion of Cameroon, Niger, Chad, 
and Benin Republic into the analysis could assist in defeating groups like BHT, ISWAP, 
and Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb known to promote collective violence in these countries. 
This study combined two methodologies in an attempt to provide solutions for the 
AFN in conducting OIE. This method is not limited to Nigeria, as it has potential to support 
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any military of a state that desires to understand the historical build-up of information that 
results in violence and to leverage the potential of early warnings. As these capabilities 
advance, it may become more possible for state actors to effectively predict and counter 






























A. NIGERIAN MULTILINGUAL DICTIONARY OF “PEACE AND 
VIOLENCE” 













AirForce, Air Force 
AirForce, forces aÃ©riennes 
AirForce, Ø§Ù„Ù‚ÙˆØ§Øª Ø§Ù„Ø¬ÙˆÙŠØ© 
AirForce, Sojan Sama 
AirForce, Agbara afáº¹fáº¹ 












Asylum, Ibi aabo 




Bad, mara kyau 
Bad, buburu 























Better, mafi kyau 
Better, dara julá» 




Blissful, mai annashuwa 
Blissful, alarinrin 























Calm, kwantar da hankali 
Calm, tunu 














Cheerful, de bonne humeur 
Cheerful, Ù…Ø±Ø 
Cheerful, na gaisuwa 
Cheerful, á»yaya 
















































Cooperate, hadin kai 
Cooperate, ifá»wá»sowá»pá» 






















Dependable, Ø¬Ø¯ÙŠØ± Ø¨Ø§Ù„Ø«Ù‚Ø© 
Dependable, abin dogaro 
Dependable, igbarale 











Devote, yÃ sá»tá» 
Devote, itinye oge 
Easygoing, Easygoing 
Easygoing, facile Ã vivre 
Easygoing, Ø¹ÙŠØ´Ø© Ø±ØºÙŠØ¯Ø© 
Easygoing, sauki 
Easygoing, lo jeje 

















Excellent, kyau kwarai 
Excellent, o tayá» 











Fair, áº¹wÃ  









































Generous, ÙƒØ±ÙŠÙ… - Ø³Ø®ÙŠ 
Generous, Kyautayawa 
Generous, oninurere 



































Happy, farin ciki 
Happy, dun 









Hardworking, Ø§Ù„Ø¹Ù…Ù„ Ø§Ù„Ø¬Ø§Ø¯ 
Hardworking, mai aiki tukuru 

















Heartwarming, ØªØ³Ø®ÙŠÙ† Ø§Ù„Ù‚Ù„Ø¨ 
Heartwarming, wariyar zuciya 
Heartwarming, igbona 























Honourable, mai daraja 
Honourable, áº¹ni-á»lÃ¡ 
Honourable, nkwanye ugwu 
Hospitality, Hospitality 
Hospitality, hospitalitÃ© 
Hospitality, ØØ³Ù† Ø§Ù„Ø¶ÙŠØ§ÙØ© 
Hospitality, baÆ™unci 
Hospitality, aalejÃ² 



































Inspire, yi wahayi 
Inspire, iwuri 









Interesting, Ù…Ø«ÙŠØ± Ù„Ù„Ø¥Ø¹Ø¬Ø§Ø¨ 











Jointtaskforce, Groupe d’intervention mixte 
Jointtaskforce, ÙØ±Ù‚Ø© Ø¹Ù…Ù„ Ù…Ø´ØªØ±ÙƒØ© 
Jointtaskforce, hadin gwiwa na aiki 
Jointtaskforce, apapá» iá¹£áº¹ á¹£iá¹£e 







Kano__peace, Kano peace 
Kano__peace, Kano paix 
Kano__peace, ÙƒØ§Ù†Ùˆ Ø§Ù„Ø³Ù„Ø§Ù… 
Kano__peace, Zaman lafiya Kano 
Kano__peace, Alaafia Kano 
Kano__peace, Udo diri Kano 
Kind, Kind 
Kind, gentil 











Lagos__peace, Lagos peace 
Lagos__peace, Lagos paix 
Lagos__peace, Ø§Ù„Ø³Ù„Ø§Ù… Ù„Ø§ØºÙˆØ³ 
Lagos__peace, Aminci a Legas 
Lagos__peace, Alaafia Eko 






































Maiduguri__peace, Maiduguri peace 
Maiduguri__peace, paix de maiduguri 
Maiduguri__peace, Ø§Ù„Ø³Ù„Ø§Ù… maiduguri 
Maiduguri__peace, maiduguri zaman lafiya 
Maiduguri__peace, maiduguri alafia 











Merciful, mai rahama 
Merciful, alaanu 










Modest, suna fadin 
Modest, suna fadin 


















Nigeria, NÃ Ã¬jÃrÃÃ  
Nigeria, Naijeria 
Nigeria__Unity, NigerianUnity 
Nigeria__Unity, UnitÃ© nigÃ©riane 
Nigeria__Unity, Ø§Ù„ÙˆØØ¯Ø© Ø§Ù„Ù†ÙŠØ¬ÙŠØ±ÙŠØ© 
Nigeria__Unity, Hadin kan Najeriya 
Nigeria__Unity, Isokan NÃ Ã¬jÃrÃÃ  
Nigeria__Unity, Nigeriandá»‹ n’otu Naijeria 
Nigeria__Peace, NigerianPeace 
Nigeria__Peace, Paix nigÃ©riane 
Nigeria__Peace, Ø§Ù„Ø³Ù„Ø§Ù… Ø§Ù„Ù†ÙŠØ¬ÙŠØ±ÙŠ 
Nigeria__Peace, Amincin Najeriya 
Nigeria__Peace, Alaafia Ilu NÃ Ã¬jÃrÃÃ  





Obedient, á¹£Ã¨gbá»rÃ n 
Obedient, nrube isi 
Openminded, Openminded 
Openminded, ouvert d’esprit 
Openminded, Ù…Ù†ÙØªØ Ø§Ù„Ø¹Ù‚Ù„ÙŠØ© 
Openminded, saukin kai 
Openminded, okan lila 

















Polite, mai ladabi 

















































Reliable, abin dogaro 
Reliable, gbáº¹káº¹le 
Reliable, pá»¥rá»¥ á»‹dabere 
Respect, Respect 














Solidarity, Hadin kai 
Solidarity, Isopá» 




Stability, Kwanciyar hankali 
Stability, duroá¹£iná¹£in 





Strong, mai Æ™arfi 
Strong, lagbara 
Strong, siri ike 
strike, strike 
strike, la grÃ¨ve 
strike, Ø¥Ø¶Ø±Ø§Ø¨ 
strike, yajin aiki 
strike, ká»lu 




































Tranquility, Irá»run O 

















Unity, hadin kai 
Unity, isokan 
Unity, á»‹dá»‹ n’otu 
Violence, Violence 
Violence, la violence 
Violence, Ø¹Ù†Ù 
Violence, tashin hankali 
Violence, iwa-ipa 










Willing, a shirye 
Willing, fáº¹ 




Wrong, ba daidai ba 
Wrong, ti ko tá» 


































B. TABLE A2. HASHTAGS AND TWITTER ACCOUNTS SEARCHED 
















5 Unity #unity 








8 Cool FM #coolfmkano 








C. TABLE A 3. NRN TOPIC MODELLING TABLE 
TOPIC ASSIGNED LABEL WORDS 
2 USA Discourse Nigeria, Amp, Statedept, 
Read, whitehouse 
11  Game Development Unity, gamedev, 
madewithunity, game, 
indiedev 
12 BHT, Biafraexit Nigeria, bokoharam, amp, 
boko, biafraexit 
 
13 President Buhari arrestbuhari, lives, save, 
imamofpeace, bokoharam 
17 ISWAP News Bokoharam, iswap, 
breaking, news, Moguno 
24 BHT Videos Executed, video, workers, 
bokoharam, amp 
26 Muslim Festivals eidmubarak, eidaladha, eid, 
abuja, Nigeria. 
28 Indigenous Games  unity, gamedev, indiedev, 
indiegamedev, 
gamedevelopment 
29 BHT Releases 
Terrorists, bokoharam, amp 
releasing, country 
32 Educational 
unity nature education 
ududueududa, global 
33 Welfare and Medicals Tent, headline, hospital, ua, 
uabn 
83 
34 Politics in Nigeria Unity, regime, power, 
enemies, zionist, type, 
stands, snouts, satan, nation, 
loudly, lies, Islamic, 
encroaching, embodied. 






46 Ndume and BHT Nigeria, bokoharam, a, 
ndume, boko 
47 Covid-19 in Nigeria Nigeria, ua, covid, rate, 
exchange 
49 Buhari’s Administration Nigeria, Nigerians, father, 
Buhari, a 
 
D. TABLE A 4. NRN TOPIC MODULARITY CLASS TABLE 
Modularity class Percentage Names (By Degree) Color 
6 10.66% Moses Agbo Purple 
28 9.83% Human Angle Green 
12 9.52% Chidi Odinaka Blue 
7 6.14% Edeh Alex Grey 
16 5.67% Sahara Reporters Orange 
4 5.23% Mazi Nnamdi Kanu Pink 
9 4.51% Mohd RCD Dark Green 
13 4.37% Ottogs Light Brown 





Modularity Class Cluster Names Topic Number and Assigned Label 
6 Moses Agbo 12(BHT, Biafraexit); 29(BHT Releases); 
39(Donald Trump & Nnamdi Kanu) 
28 Human Angle 11(Game Development); 28(Indigenous 
Games) 
12 Chidi Odinaka 33(Welfare and Health); 47(Covid-19 in 
Nigeria) 
7 Edeh Alex 13(President Buhari) 
16 Sahara Reporters 46(Ndume and BHT); 49(Buhari’s 
Administration) 
4 Mazi Nnamdi 
Kanu 
2(USA Discourse); 12(BHT, Biafraexit); 
39(Donald Trump Nnamdi Kanu) 
9 Mohd RCD 17(ISWAP News); 24(BHT Videos) 
13 Ottogs 26(Muslim Festivals) 
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